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NOTES
ABUSING STANDING: FURTHERING THE
CONSERVATIVE AGENDA
Article III of the United States Constitution grants the judicial
branch the broad power to decide all "Cases and Controversies."'
This broad grant of authority, however, is unaccompanied by any
specific definition of what constitutes a case or controversy. As a
result, the United States Supreme Court has developed several ju-
dicial doctrines that define the scope of the cases and controversies
clause. A federal court will not grant jurisdiction to hear a case if
the suit involves a political question,2 requires an advisory opin-
ion,3 is moot,4 or is brought by a litigant who lacks standing to sue.
In each of these areas, the federal court's refusal to grant jurisdic-
tion rests on the belief that no article III case or controversy exists.
1. The Constitution states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority:-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction,-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Cit-
izens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citi-
zens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. E.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (dis-
missing Senator Goldwater's challenge to President Carter's termination of the United
States-Taiwan mutual defense treaty because it concerned a nonjusticiable political
question).
3. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (dismissing constitutional chal-
lenge to division of Cherokee Indian land because of absence of actual controversy).
4. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissing as moot petitioner's
constitutional challenge to law school admissions policy as discriminatory because petitioner
would have completed school by the time decision was rendered).
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During the course of Chief Justice Warren Burger's tenure on
the Supreme Court,5 the Court's application of the standing doc-
trine was a continual source of controversy. In the 1970s, the Court
developed a three-prong standing analysis. First, the litigant must
show that he has suffered an actual or threatened injury.' Second,
the injury must be traceable to the alleged. conduct of the defend-
ant.7 Third, the injury must be redressable by a favorable decision
on the merits.8
A number of major standing cases9 decided by the Burger Court
attracted a great deal of criticism. Most commentators criticized
the Court's inconsistent application of the same standard from one
case to the next.10 A harsher measure of criticism, however,
charged that the Burger Court's standing decisions were little more
than a thinly disguised method of deciding cases on the merits.11
5. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was confirmed by the United States Senate on June 9,
1969, and served as Chief Justice until he resigned at the end of the October 1985 Term.
6. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975).
7. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
8. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Warth, 422 U.S. at 508 (1975). For a thorough discus-
sion of the history and current view of standing, see Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 68 (1984).
9. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984);
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95; Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. 464; Duke Power Co., 438 U.S.
59; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26; Warth, 422 U.S. 490; Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974).
10. E.g., Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
862 (1985); Nichol, supra note 8; Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Un-
principled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185 (1981); Sedler, Standing and the Bur-
ger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 863
(1977).
11. See Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 41; Nichol, Abusing
Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 637, 658-59 (1985) [here-
inafter Nichol, Abusing Standing]; Nichol, Backing Into the Future: The Burger Court and
the Federal Forum, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 341 (1982) [hereinafter Nichol, Backing Into the
Future]; Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61
N.C.L. REV. 798 (1983) [hereinafter Nichol, Valley Forge]; Tushnet, The New Law of
Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); Varat, Variable Jus-
ticiability and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEx. L. REV. 273 (1980). See also Allen, 468 U.S. at
782 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 493 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 239-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
ABUSING STANDING
This Note offers an explanation for the tangled web of Burger
Court standing decisions. First, this Note examines the core
themes of American conservatism over the past two decades. Sec-
ond, the Note demonstrates that Presidents Richard Nixon12 and
Ronald Reagan 13 have nominated Supreme Court Justices based
largely on the Justices' ideological and political compatibility with
the conservative policy agenda. After reviewing a number of stand-
ing cases, this Note concludes that the standing doctrine has been
abused to further the conservative agenda.
DEFINING THE CONSERvATIVE AGENDA
Certainly, no singular definition can precisely capture the mean-
ing of the word "conservative" in the context of American political
thought. Recourse to historical sources, however, demonstrates
that four recurrent themes form the foundation of American con-
servatism. The "conservative agenda" is a shorthand way of refer-
ring to these four themes, which guide the conservative policy-
making process. 14
The first premise of American conservatism is the belief in a
small, less intrusive federal government. Conservatism favors local
and state governments that are closer to the people and hence
more responsive.15 Conservatism's second core belief is a strong
commitment to the free market system.' 6 Conservatives regard free
market capitalism, unimpeded by government intrusion, as the
best remedy for economic and social ills.
As a counterpart to a belief in the free market, the third theme
of conservatism centers on government-sponsored social welfare
programs. Conservatives harbor grave suspicions about the wisdom
of such programs and therefore exhibit a distaste for them. Fi-
12. Richard Nixon was elected to his first term as President on November 5, 1968, and his
second term on November 7, 1972. He resigned from office on August 9, 1974.
13. Ronald Reagan was elected to his first term as President on November 4, 1980, and
his second term on November 6, 1984.
14. See Kristol, What is a Neo-Conservative?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1976, at 17. Professor
Kristol outlines the five tenets of an oversimplified but not distorted profile of the neo-
conservative political tendency. This Note identifies three of Kristol's tenets as recurrent
themes at the foundation of American conservatism.
15. See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
16. See Kristol, supra note 14, at 17. See also infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
17. See ihfra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
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nally, conservatism manifests a deep concern for "traditional" and
"family" values. Such values are viewed as necessary for the proper
functioning of the social order.18
Decentralization of Federal Government Power
An overriding theme in conservative thought is the desire to de-
centralize the federal government and return power to the state
and local level. This desire is accompanied by a belief that the cen-
tralized federal government has usurped power and drained re-
sources away from the level of government at which they are best
used. Conservatives therefore seek to reduce the federal role by
shifting the responsibility for program development, management,
and funding to the states.
In 1969, President Richard Nixon unveiled his "New Federal-
ism" program.19 The cornerstone of Nixon's New Federalism was
revenue sharing.20 After the revenue-sharing proposal was not
adopted in his first term, Nixon stated that revenue sharing "can
help reverse what has been the flow of power and resources toward
Washington by sending power and resources back to the States, to
the communities, and to the people. 21 Nixon believed that re-
sources could be used more effectively at the local level.22
Ronald Reagan pursued this same "New Federalism" theme. A
key objective of the Reagan Administration has been to curb the
size and growth of the federal government.23
18. See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
19. See Nixon Urges Support for "New Federalism," "New Realism," 25 CONG. Q. ALMA-
NAC 101A (1969) (complete text of President Nixon's Sept. 1, 1969, speech to the National
Governors' Conference).
20. See id. See also Nixon's State of the Union Text 11, 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 5A, 9A
(1972) (detailed version of message delivered to Congress on Jan. 20, 1972); Manpower Rev-
enue Sharing, 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 35A (1972).
21. Nixon's State of the Union Text II, supra note 20, at 9A.
22. See Manpower Revenue Sharing, supra note 20, at 35A. Nixon described revenue
sharing as an effort to move necessary funds and decision-making power to the level of
government best able to deal with a particular problem. "They [revenue sharing programs]
require us in Washington to give up some of our power, so that more power can be returned
to the States, to the localities, and to the people, where it will be better used." Id.
23. Reagan's RX for a Sick Economy, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 19, 1981, at 23, 26.
See President Reagan's Inaugural Address, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC llE, 12E (1981).
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My administration seeks to limit the size, intrusiveness, and cost
of Federal activities as much as possible [without neglecting fed-
eral responsibilities] ... .Instead, ways are being found to
streamline Federal activity, to limit it to those areas and respon-
sibilities that are truly Federal in nature . .24
Reagan blames current problems on government intrusion, stating
that "[ilt is no coincidence that our present troubles parallel and
are proportionate [to] the intervention and intrusion in our lives
that have resulted from unnecessary and excessive growth of gov-
ernment."2 5 Reagan has continued his assault on big government
throughout his administration.
Promoting the Free Market System
Conservatives consistently have viewed the free enterprise sys-
tem as the most effective vehicle for producing domestic tranquil-
ity.26 Unshackled by government intrusion, conservatives feel that
the free market system can provide for Americans much more ef-
fectively than government programs. Richard Nixon believed that
"[p]rivate enterprise-far more effectively than government-can
provide the jobs, train the unemployed, build the homes, offer the
new opportunities that will produce progress-not promises-in
solving the problems of America. '27
Although Nixon possessed a deep belief in the ability of the free
market system to provide economic solutions,28 no recent President
has maintained as steadfast an allegiance to the free market ideal
as Ronald Reagan. When Reagan took office in 1981, his adminis-
tration's overriding goal was the restoration of America through
the revival of free market economic power.29 The Reagan economic
24. President's Budget Message, 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 8E, 10E (1984).
25. President Reagan's Inaugural Address, supra note 23, at 12E.
26. See Kristol, supra note 14, at 17.
27. The Promises That Nixon Has Made, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Mar. 3, 1969, at 50,
51 (review of Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign promises).
28. See Nixon's State of Union Text II, supra note 20, at 8A-9A; Welfare Reform, 28
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 48A (1972).
29. A key issue in both Reagan campaigns was the state of the American economy. Rea-
gan has continually advocated decreased taxation, reduced government regulation, and gov-
ernment spending cuts. The main purpose of this three-point program was the revival of
American free market economic power. In his 1981 inaugural address, he stated: "It is time
to reawaken this industrial giant, to get government back within its means, and to lighten
1988]
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plan embodies a belief that "businessmen freed of heavy-handed
regulation will invest more; workers, released from oppressive taxa-
tion will labor harder and save more; the economy will grow, pro-
ducing more jobs and less inflation. 30 Reagan believes that the
plan he envisions is essential to the nation's continued health and
vitality.31
Reducing Government-Sponsored Social Welfare Programs
The third theme at the core of American conservatism concerns
the proper role of government in the area of social welfare. This
theme manifests itself in three ways. First, conservatives generally
do not believe that social welfare programs are the proper province
of government. Second, they maintain that social welfare programs
hamper the efficient functioning of the free market system. Third,
conservatives believe that many if not most individuals do not
need government assistance.
On one level, conservatives do not feel that government should
be in the business of delivering large-scale social welfare programs.
In 1968, Richard Nixon stated that "America is a great nation to-
day-not because of what Government did for people, but because
of what people did for themselves over 190 years in this country."32
our punitive tax burden. And these will be our first priorities, and on these principles, there
will be no compromise." President Reagan's Inaugural Address, supra note 23, at 12E. In
his February 5, 1981, presidential broadcast to the nation, he stated:
We invented the assembly line and mass production, but punitive tax policies
and excessive and unnecessary regulations plus government borrowing have
stifled our ability to update plant and equipment. When capital investment is
made it's too often for some unproductive alterations demanded by govern-
ment to meet various of its regulations.
President Reagan's Economic Policy Address, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 13E, 14E (1981). See
President Reagan's Economic Proposals Text, id. at 15E.
30. Church, Conservative Conservatism, TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 10, 11.
31. See President Reagan's 2nd Inaugural Address, 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 3D (1985);
President's Budget Message, supra note 24, at 13E ("Bold, vigorous fiscal policy action to
break the momentum of entrenched spending programs, together with responsible and re-
strained monetary policy, is essential to keep the recovery on track; essential to the Nation's
future economic health and vitality").
32. Nixon: "The Long Dark Night for America is About to End, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., Aug. 19, 1968, at 54, 76 (quoting Nixon's 1968 nomination acceptance speech delivered
to the Republican Party Convention, Aug. 8, 1968).
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The Nixon Administration justified budget cuts as the elimina-
tion of programs outside the proper scope of government responsi-
bility." Ronald Reagan has echoed this sentiment. "Spending by
Government must be limited to those functions which are the
proper province of Government. We can no longer afford things
simply because we think of them. '3 4
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, conservatives were exasper-
ated by the increase in social welfare spending. On one level, con-
servatives argued that such programs were not proper exercises of
government power, but they also began to hammer away at the
negative effects of welfare programs. Richard Nixon maintained
that federal intervention in social problems had adversely affected
the private sector35 and that the welfare system was destroying the
value of hard work. He stated: "Our states and cities find them-
selves sinking in a welfare quagmire as caseloads increase, as costs
escalate and as the welfare system stagnates enterprise and per-
petuates dependency." 6
Neoconservative theory maintains that although the truly needy
deserve some measure of government assistance, the bulk of social
welfare programs help those who can help themselves.3 7 "The
33. 1975 Spending Path Lies Between Inflation, Recession, 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 269
(1974). Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated, "Some of
HEW's programs are in areas where the federal government just does not belong.....
Id.
34. President's Economic Message, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 15E, 1iE (1981).
35. See Human Resources, 29 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 21A-22A (1973). Nixon stated:
During the middle and late 1960's, under the pressure of this impatient ideal-
ism, Federal intervention to help meet human needs increased sharply. Provi-
sion of services from Federal programs directly to individuals began to be re-
garded as the rule in human resource policy, rather than the rare exception it
had been in the past.
The Government in those years undertook sweeping, sometimes almost uto-
pian, commitments in one area of social concern after another. The State and
local governments and the private sector were elbowed aside with little regard
for the dislocations that might result. Literally hundreds of new programs were
established on the assumption that even the most complex problems could be
quickly solved by throwing enough Federal dollars at them.
Id. at 21A.
36. Text of President's Welfare, "Workfare" Speech, 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 75A (1969).
37. See Kristol, supra note 14, at 17 (neoconservatives approve of programs that provide
needed security and comfort but do so with a minimum of government intrusion). In Rea-
gan's words: "This Government will meet its responsibility to help those in need. But poli-
cies that increase dependency, break up families and destroy self-respect are not progres-
1988] 393
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choice before the American worker is clear: The work ethic builds
character and self-reliance; the welfare ethic destroys character
and leads to a vicious cycle of dependency. The work ethic builds
strong people; the welfare ethic breeds weak people." 8
Ronald Reagan believes that social programs are outside the le-
gitimate realm of federal government power.3 9 Indeed, part of Rea-
gan's economic program has been the reduction of federal spending
for social welfare, forcing the private sector to meet the economic
and social challenges of America. 0
Like Nixon, Reagan maintains that the truly needy will be pro-
tected, but that funding levels can be reduced substantially by
eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.4' Conservatives predictably
will attempt to eliminate or at least scale back government assis-
tance programs. 42 If a program cannot be eliminated, program eli-
gibility is limited as much as practicable to insure that only the
truly needy receive government assistance.43
Promoting and Protecting Traditional Values and Institutions
The final theme in American conservatism centers on the values
that conservatives promote. "Neo-conservatism tends to be re-
spectful of traditional values and institutions: religion, the family,
sive, they are reactionary." State of the Union Address, 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 8D, 9D
(1985). Nixon stated: "To put it bluntly and simply-any system which makes it more prof-
itable for a man not to work than to work, and which encourages a man to desert his family
rather than stay with his family, is wrong and indefensible." 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 75A
(1969).
38. Work v. Welfare: Where Nixon Stands, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 18, 1972, at
76, 77.
39. See supra text accompanying note 34.
40. See Reagan's Budget Cuts, 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 434 (1985); President Reagan's In-
augural Address, supra note 23.
41. Text of President Reagan's Address to the Nation, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 30E, 31E
(1981) (delivered Sept. 24, 1981). "When I talk waste and fraud, I'm talking about a lot of
things that we discovered in California-that there are people who are in programs who
should not be there." Reagan's RX for a Sick Economy, supra note 23, at 24.
42. Some may argue that the following statement, made by Reagan in response to media
human interest stories during the 1982 recession, demonstrates conservative insensitivity to
the plight of the lower classes. "'Is it news that some fellow out in South Succotash some-
place has just been laid off, that he should be interviewed nationwide ... ?'" News from
South Succotash, AMERICA, April 3, 1982, at 252, 252.
43. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986) (restricting food stamp eligibility).
[Vol. 29:387
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the 'high culture' of Western civilization.""' Conservatives see
these values as essential to the proper functioning of the social
order.45
During the 1980s the Reagan Administration has placed primary
emphasis on religious and family values. Reagan has consistently
supported efforts to legalize school prayer and ban legalized abor-
tion,46 expressing "shock" over his perception that the first amend-
ment has been used "as a reason to keep traditional moral values
away from policymaking. '47
Nonetheless, Reagan does believe that the acceptance of tradi-
tional values is on the upswing. "Of all the changes that have
swept America the past four years, none brings greater promise
than our rediscovery of the values of faith, freedom, family, work
and neighborhood. '48
While Richard Nixon lamented a perceived decline in religious
faith and family values,49 conservatives in the late 1960s and early
1970s were preoccupied with crime and student unrest. As the
44. Kristol, supra note 14, at 17.
45. Id. Kristol also states:
They [neoconservatives] believe that the individual who is abruptly 'liberated'
from the sovereignty of traditional values will soon find himself experiencing
the vertigo and despair of nihilism. Nor do they put much credence in the
notion that individuals can "create" their own values and then incorporate
them into a satisfying "lifestyle."
Id.
46. See State of the Union Address, supra note 37, at 10D (1985); State of the Union
Address, 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 5E, 7E (1984).
47. President Reagan and the Bible, CHRISTIANrrY TODAY, Mar. 4, 1983, at 46, 47 (ex-
cerpts from address of Jan. 31, 1983). Reagan goes on to state, "The First Amendment was
not written to protect people and their laws from religious values. It was written to protect
those values from government tyranny." Id.
48. State of the Union Address, supra note 37, at 10D.
49. See Old Values Being Torn Away, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1971, at 37
(excerpts from a television interview of President Nixon by reporter Barbara Walters on
NBC's "Today" show, Mar. 15, 1971). Expressing his perceptions of the "value" issue,
Nixon stated:
My guess is that, as we see the religious faith of people being lost, as we see
family ties being less and less meaningful to people, as we see, frankly, life
becoming perhaps less demanding, less demanding in the sense that it is possi-
ble now for most people to get a job and not have to have that compulsion of
having to do better in order to make a living - as we see all of these things, I
believe that the tendency there is to affect young people in a way that they
move away from principle, from values, and are at somewhat loose ends.
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Vietnam War continued and antiwar protest intensified, conserva-
tives perceived that the traditional value of patriotism was under
attack. The protests and their accompanying violence were viewed
as the work of a small group of people who were bent on uprooting
traditional values and promoting communism.50 In 1968, the late J.
Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
warned of the goals of the antiwar protesters: "The protest activity
of the New Left and the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society],
under the guise of legitimate expression of dissent, has created an
insurrectionary climate which has conditioned a number of young
Americans-especially college students-to resort to civil disobedi-
ence and violence." 51
Hoover believed that the student protest movement was a com-
munist-inspired front that possessed "an almost passionate desire
to destroy the traditional values of our democratic society and the
existing social order. ' 52 Journalists condemned the activities of
student demonstrators as treasonous.53 Melvin R. Laird, then Sec-
retary of Defense, stated, "Hanoi's strategy is clear: The leaders in
Hanoi expect to achieve victory by waiting for us to abandon the
conflict as a result of antiwar protests in this country."54 Other
White House officials warned that "[t]here is no doubt that each
and every speech [in Congress against the administration], and
50. See Hoover, The Story of Crime in U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct 7, 1968, at 61,
64 (text of speech delivered by J. Edgar Hoover to the National Commission on Causes and
Prevention of Violence, Sept. 18, 1968).
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 63-64.
53. See Lawrence, Is Treason Permissible as Merely "Free Speech"?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 1969, at 108. Criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. C6mmunity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which held that Iowa high
school students had a right to wear black arm bands to protest United States participation
in the Vietnam War, Lawrence said:
How, in the face of the High Court's new decision, can the schools effectively
teach patriotism and a love of country? ... There certainly is no justification
for a ruling by the highest court in the land which takes away the right of
school authorities in a government supported institution to bar "symbolic"
treason. We are telling the world that we permit students in our public schools
to indicate, in effect, that they are "adhering to the enemies" of the United
States and "giving them aid and comfort."
Id.
54. Vietnam Debate - Will it Help or Hinder Peace?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 20,
1969, at 29.
[Vol. 29:387
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each and every demonstration helps the Communist cause [in
North Vietnam]. ' 5
THE NOMINATION OF CONSERVATIVE JUSTICES
Many factors are considered in the nomination of an individual
to a seat on the United States Supreme Court,5 6 but a President's
demonstrated preference for candidates whose political ideologies
are similar to his own is not surprising. 5 Two prominent factors
considered by a President in making his nomination are "whether
the nominee favors Presidential policies and programs" and
whether the nominee's judicial record meets the President's "crite-
ria of constitutional construction. ' 58 Richard Nixon and Ronald
Reagan both adhered to this practice of giving ideological factors a
prominent role in their nominations of individuals to the Supreme
Court.59
Richard Nixon quite bluntly delineated his criteria for a Su-
preme Court Justice. He sought an individual who
leans to the conservative side ... conservative in respect of his
attitude toward the Constitution. It is the judge's responsibility
and the Supreme Court's responsibility, to interpret the Consti-
tution and not to go beyond that in putting his own socio-eco-
55. Id.
56. See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 49-70 (2d ed. 1985).
57. See id. at 65-72. "Political and ideological compatibility often go hand in hand in
influencing Presidential choices for the Supreme Court." Id. at 65.
58. Id. Abraham lists several other factors that a President almost certainly will consider:
(1) whether his choice will render him more popular among influential interest
groups; (2) whether the nominee has been a loyal member of the President's
party; (3) whether the nominee favors Presidential programs and policies; (4)
whether the nominee is acceptable (or at least not 'personally obnoxious') to
the home-state Senators; (5) whether the nominee's judicial record, if any,
meets the Presidential criteria of constitutional construction; (6) whether the
President is indebted to the nominee for past political services; and (7)
whether he feels 'good' or 'comfortable' about his choice.
Id. at 65.
59. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
Ideological considerations have been a factor in Reagan's judicial selection process since
his days as governor of California. "Reagan's staff, which handled the selection process right
up to the congratulatory phone calls, did possess an ideological agenda. 'They didn't have to
be Republicans,' says the governor's first legal-affairs secretary, Paul Haerle, 'but we made
sure they weren't liberals.'" Governor Reagan and the Courts, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1980, at
78.
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nomic philosophy into decisions in a way that goes beyond...
the Constitution."0
Nixon was looking for nominees who believed in a strict construc-
tion of the Constitution"l and who would not impose their own so-
cial and economic views on the nation 2 but would leave such
choices to the legislative branch."
The four men Nixon appointed to the Supreme Court-Warren
E. Burger,64 Harry A. Blackmun, 5 William H. Rehnquist,6 and
60. Nixon Fights Back, 21 NAT'L REV. 1102, 1102 (1969) (explaining Nixon's reasons for
nominating Judge Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court).
61. Changes Nixon May Make in Federal Courts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1968,
at 42. Nixon stated: "We need more strict constructionists on the highest court of the
United States. In my view, the duty of a Justice of the Supreme Court is to interpret the
law, not to make law, and the men I appoint will share that view." Id. See also The Nixon
Court, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1971, at 18.
62. See Role of the Supreme Court-Nixon Gives His Criteria, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 1, 1971, at 62 (full text of speech given Oct. 21, 1971, announcing the nominations of
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist to the Supreme Court). Nixon described his judicial
philosophy in the following terms: "[I]t is my belief that it is the duty of a judge to interpret
the Constitution and not to place himself above the Constitution or outside the Constitu-
tion. He should not twist or bend the Constitution in order to j erpetuate his personal politi-
cal and social views." Id.
One conservative commentator capsulized the task ahead for the Nixon Court:
The problem of abuse of power by the Supreme Court will not be solved even
if President Nixon has the opportunity to appoint three or four new Justices in
the next year or two. It will be solved when the American people insist that the
Supreme Court has the authority only to "interpret" the Constitution. If it is
to be revised or rewritten, this must be done by the American people-by
amending the Constitution itself.
Lawrence, A "New" Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2, 1969, at 96, 96.
63. See The Promises That Nixon Made, supra note 27. Nixon was looking for men who
would employ a strict interpretation of the Constitution "rather than ... breaking through
into new areas that are really the prerogative of the Congress." Id. at 51.
64. Warren E. Burger was confirmed as Chief Justice by the United States Senate on
June 9, 1969, by a vote of 74 to 3. Burger replaced retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren.
65. Harry A. Blackmun was confirmed by the Senate on May 12, 1970, by a vote of 94 to
0. Blackmun was Nixon's third choice for the vacancy created by the departure of Associate
Justice Abe Fortas. The Senate rejected two Southern "strict constructionists" nominated
by Nixon: Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit and Judge G. Harrold Carswell, then a judge with six months' experience
on the United States Court of Appeals.for the Fifth Circuit. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 56,
at 15-18.
66. William H. Rehnquist was confirmed by the Senate on December 15, 1971, as an As-
sociate Justice, replacing John Marshall Harlan. Justice Rehnquist was confirmed by the
Senate as Chief Justice on Sept. 17, 1986, replacing retiring Chief Justice Warren Burger.
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Lewis F. Powell67 -have for the most part fulfilled Nixon's expec-
tations. Although the Supreme Court did not veer sharply to the
right as many had expected,"" Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and Powell played major roles in intensifying the stand-
ing inquiry, thereby restricting access to federal court. 9
The conservatives' goal in the 1980s is much the same as it was
in the 1960s-to appoint judges who exercise judicial restraint.
Conservatives continue to abhor the judicial activism of the War-
ren Court.70 To conservatives, judicial restraint means withdrawing
from areas of economic and social controversy.7 1
Judicial restraint is more consistent with the idea of self-govern-
ment. It enables the American people to express their moral and
67. Lewis F. Powell was confirmed by the Senate on December 9, 1971, by a vote of 89 to
1. He replaced Hugo L. Black.
68. See The "Burger Court". A Trend Toward Conservatism, but-, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., July 16, 1973, at 29. "What is emerging, experts say, is a pattern of judicial re-
straint-narrower interpretation of the Constitution, in line with Mr. Nixon's 'strict con-
structionist' philosophy, though not always in keeping with his legislative objectives." Id.
President Nixon rated his own role in reformulating the Court, stating, "I feel at the
present time that the Court is as balanced as I have had an opportunity to make it." First
Nixon Court, 24 NAT'L REv. 785, 785 (1971).
69. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority,
joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger); Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Pow-
ell, and Chief Justice Burger); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978) (Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976) (Justice Powell wrote for the majority); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (Jusice
Powell wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief
Justice Burger); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
(Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (Chief Justice
Burger wrote for the majority, joined by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun).
70. See Courts, Presidents and Precedents, 38 NAT'L REV. 4817, 4818 (1986); Kilpatrick,
Conservatism at the High Court, 33 NAT'L REv. 893, 893 (1981) (pointing out that as to the
transgressions of the Warren Court, "[tihe activism that marked the days of Earl Warren,
when the Court plunged into seas of political and social controversy, has been replaced by a
cautious and respectful conservatism"); Thomas, Reagan's Mr. Right, TmE, June 30, 1986,
at 24 ("This is the beginning of a new [era in which] judicial restraint is going to be
fashionable").
71. McLaughlin, Making Reaganism Last, 35 NAT'L Rv. 1594, 1594 (1983) ("the Court
should accommodate the wishes of the people as they are expressed by their elected repre-
sentatives"); see Rees, The Constitution, the Court and the President-Elect, 32 NAT'L REV.
1595, 1597 (1980).
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religious views in a manner consistent with basic liberty and our
constitutional design. Much of the law from the Supreme Court
has impeded the ability of communities to decide moral ques-
tions for themselves. 7 2
Conservatives may couch their argument in terms of an abstract
belief in "judicial restraint," but their underlying rationale is more
concrete. Judicial restraint comports with their core beliefs in
smaller government, less social welfare, and a free market system.
Conservatives in the 1980s have sought to further conservative
goals by bringing to the bench federal judges and Supreme Court
Justices who share these conservative beliefs. 3
LIBERALIZED STANDING BEFORE THE BURGER COURT
The Court in Baker v. Carr 4 laid the foundation for modern
standing analysis. The petitioners in Baker challenged a Tennessee
statute fixing the apportionment of the Tennessee state legislature
on the basis of population figures from the 1900 federal census.75
The petitioners claimed that the apportionment scheme denied
them equal protection of the law because population shifts after
1900 effectively diluted their votes.7 6
In determining whether it could properly hear the case, the
Court in Baker characterized the standing inquiry as whether "the
appellants [have] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
' 7
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue be-
cause they asserted "'a plain, direct, and adequate interest in
72. The Separation of Church and State: Should the U.S. Supreme Court Play an Ac-
tivist Role?, CHRiSTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 21, 1986, at 52, 53.
73. The 1980 Republican Party platform stated: "We will work for the appointment of
judges ... who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life."
Governor Reagan and the Courts, supra note 59, at 78. See supra notes 70-72 and accompa-
nying text.
74. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
75. Id. at 191-92.
76. Id. at 187-88.
77. Id. at 204. The "personal stake" and "concrete adverseness" requirements were neces-
sary to ensure that the appellant would vigorously protect the rights of all those affected by
the statute. Id. at 204-08.
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maintaining the effectiveness of their votes' "178 and not merely a
claim of" 'the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the
Government be administered according to law.' ,,79
In Flast v. Cohen, 0 the Court built on the Baker decision to
open the courthouse door a bit wider. The appellants in Flast
claimed that the expenditure of federal funds to finance textbooks
and instruction in religious schools violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment."' They claimed standing to sue
based on their status as taxpayers of the United States. 8 2 Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, stated that "[a] taxpayer
may or may not have the requisite personal stake in the outcome,
depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. There-
fore, we find no absolute bar in Article III to suits by federal tax-
payers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and
spending programs."' 3 The Court used a two-part "nexus test" to
determine whether a plaintiff had a justiciable claim.84
Under the first prong of the test, the plaintiff was required to
"allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional
power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8."85 The
second prong required the plaintiff to "establish a nexus between
the status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringe-
ment alleged." '86 In sum, the Flast test required a party to demon-
strate that the "challenged enactment exceeds specific constitu-
tional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional
taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is
generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, §
8.''s1 The Court held that the appellants had standing to sue as
78. Id. at 208 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)).
79. Id. (quoting Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)).
80. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
81. Id. at 85-86. The first amendment states, in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
U.S. CONST. amend I.
82. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
83. Id. at 101.
84. Id. at 102-03.
85. Id. at 102.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 102-03.
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taxpayers because the challenged expenditures exceeded the limi-
tations of the establishment clause of the first amendment."
The final case to liberalize standing, Association of Data
Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,8 9 provided the first con-
tours of the "injury-in-fact test."90 The injury-in-fact test marked
the Court's retreat from the legal interest test, which required a
litigant to allege an injury to a legally protected interest.9 The
new standard introduced a threshold standing inquiry that focused
instead on the quantity of harm suffered by the plaintiff.92 Com-
mentators heralded Data Processing as a modernization of stand-
ing law outside the taxpayer context that was "quickly interpreted
to encompass a wide variety of grievances."9 "
STANDING AND THE BURGER COURT
The liberalization of the standing doctrine was short lived, how-
ever. Once the four Nixon appointees took their seats on the
Court, standing inquiry became more rigorous. Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Committee To Stop the War9 4 and United States v. Rich-
ardson9" signaled the beginning of an intensified standing analysis.
The respondents in Schlesinger challenged the reserve military
status of certain members of Congress as violative of the incompat-
ibility clause of the Constitution."' Respondents claimed that four
classes of individuals were adversely affected by the members' sta-
tus as reserve military officers: all those opposed to the Vietnam
war, all officers and members of the Reserves who were not mem-
88. Id. at 103.
89. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
90. Id. at 152. See Nichol, supra, note 8, at 74-75.
91. See Nichol, supra note 8, at 74.
92. Id.
93. Nichol, Backing Into the Future, supra note 11, at 346.
94. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
95. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
96. Id. at 210-11. The incompatibility clause states:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office.
U.S. CONsT. art 1, § 6, cl. 2.
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bers of Congress, all United States taxpayers, and all United States
citizens.9 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit denied standing to the first three groups,98 and the Su-
preme Court refused to grant standing to the respondents by vir-
tue of their status as citizens.99 The Court maintained that "stand-
ing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind
alleged here which is held in common by all members of the pub-
lic."'100 The Court distinguished Schlesinger from Baker v. Carr on
the ground that the injury to the right to vote in Baker was con-
crete, whereas the injury in Schlesinger was an "abstract injury in
nonobservance of the Constitution."''1
In Richardson, the respondent challenged provisions of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Act of 1949102 concerning the public re-
porting of expenditures by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The respondent claimed that the Act violated the Constitution,
which required a regular statement and account of receipts and ex-
penditures.0 3 The Court denied standing because the respondent's
challenge was addressed not to the taxing and spending power, but
to statutes regulating the CIA.10 4 The respondent did not have a
personal stake in the outcome, as required by Baker, nor did he
meet the Flast nexus test for purposes of taxpayer standing. 105
Schlesinger and Richardson in effect foreclosed the ability of
citizens and taxpayers to sue the government for allegedly uncon-
stitutional activity. 06 Chief Justice Burger recognized this result,
97. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 211.
98. Id. at 213.
99. See id. at 226-27.
100. Id. at 220.
101. Id. at 223 n.13.
102. Central Intelligence Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
103. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167-68 (1974). The accounts clause states:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CONST. art I. § 9, cl. 7.
104. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175.
105. Id. at 175-76.
106. See Nichol, Valley Forge, supra note 11, at 809 (Schlesinger and Richardson "teach
quite clearly that standing cannot be predicated merely upon the harm a citizen sustains as
the result of the government's failure to comply with the Constitution"); Sedler, supra note
10, at 870-71 ("except in very narrowly defined circumstances, citizens and taxpayers as
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stating in Schlesinger that "[o]ur system of government leaves
many crucial decisions to the political processes. The assumption
that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have
standing, is no reason to find standing.' 10 7 This statement, coupled
with the fact that in both Schlesinger and Richardson the majority
was composed of the curious alignment of Justices White, Powell,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, with Chief Justice Burger writing the
majority opinions, 08 suggests that larger forces were at work in
these two cases.
Schlesinger and Richardson reflect a desire to protect a tradi-
tional conservative value-patriotism. Conservatives in the late
1960s and early 1970s were exasperated by the antiwar demonstra-
tions. 09 Justice Powell, a conservative himself, believed that the
protests were communist inspired. 10 Conservatives believed that
the demonstrations were hamstringing American foreign policy"'
and viewed the antiwar protest as treasonous."
2
Schlesinger and Richardson should be viewed as attempts to
take the protest against involvement in Vietnam to a higher level
via the American judicial system. Because the antiwar movement
carried on in the streets had been summarily condemned by con-
servatives, however, the movement was unlikely to find a warmer
reception in the Supreme Court. By denying standing to these liti-
gants and thus refusing to legitimitize the antiwar movement, the
conservatives on the Court were able to protect and promote a ba-
sic conservative value-an unquestioning patriotism.
The next case to mark a shift in standing analysis was Warth v.
Seldin.113 The petitioners in Warth claimed that zoning ordinances
such do not suffer 'injury in fact' from the government's alleged violation of the
Constitution").
107. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227.
108. Id. at 208-09; Richardson, 418 U.S. at 167.
109. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
110. See Powell, Civil Disobedience: Prelude to Revolution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 30, 1967, at 66. Powell offered his views on the plan and purpose of Vietnam Week, an
organized nationwide protest: "The initial planning for Vietnam Week took place at a Chi-
cago conference, instigated and dominated by Communists and fellow travelers. The Com-
munist-line objectives of Vietnam Week were to undermine United States opposition to
Communism in Vietnam and to ferment racial discord." Id. at 66-67.
111. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
112. See Lawrence, supra note 53, at 108.
113. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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imposed by the Rochester, New York, suburb of Penfield had the
purpose and effect of excluding low and moderate income people
from residing in Penfield." 4 One of the groups of petitioners 15
claimed that the Penfield zoning practices prevented them from
acquiring property in Penfield, thereby requiring them to live in
less attractive communities. 116
The Court in Warth denied the petitioners standing on two
premises. First, the Court found that the petitioners failed to al-
lege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that they had suffered
an injury as a consequence of the defendant's actions." 7 Petition-
ers claimed that the enforcement of the ordinance precluded third
parties-builders and developers-from constructing housing suit-
able for the petitioners." 8 The Court found, however, that this in-
jury was indirect because at the time of the suit, none of the peti-
tioners had "a present interest in any Penfield property; . . . none
[had] ever been denied a variance or permit by respondent
officials.""l 9
Second, the Court reasoned that even if the petitioners could
have alleged an injury, a decision in their favor would not have
redressed that injury.1s° As a result, the Court still would have de-
nied standing because the lack of "redressability"' 2' would have
given the Court's holding the more legislative flavor of tradition-
ally disfavored advisory opinions. The Court in Warth reasoned
that redressability was not assured because the petitioners "rely on
little more than the remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allega-
tions of fact, that their situation might have been better had re-
114. Id. at 495.
115. The petitioners were listed as:
[a]ll taxpayers of the City of Rochester, all low and moderate income persons
residing in the City of Rochester, all black and/or Puerto Rican/Spanish citi-
zens residing in the City of Rochester and all persons employed but excluded
from living in the Town of Penfield who are affected or may in the future be
affected by the defendants' policies and practices. ...
Id. at 493-94 n.1.
116. See id. at 496.
117. See id. at 503-08.
118. Id. at 504.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 507.
121. Redressability refers to whether a favorable decision on the merits will remove the
injury.
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spondents acted otherwise, and might improve were the court to
afford relief."122
Despite attacks that the Court in Warth erected artificially high
injury and redressability requirements, 23 the decision is quite con-
sistent with conservative policy at the time. Prior to Warth, con-
servatives were on record as being opposed to granting relief in
Warth-type situations. Richard Nixon had stated that "[w]e [the
government] will not seek to impose economic integration upon an
existing local jurisdiction ... . Nixon believed that "the law
does not now require or, in my opinion, allow the Federal Govern-
ment to have forced integration of suburbs. '125
The Warth decision is consistent not only with the particular
conservative position on the housing issue, but also with the phi-
losophy behind the issue-New Federalism. The conservative's re-
fusal to seek "economic integration" by invalidating a zoning ordi-
nance that had effectively excluded minorities and low income
individuals is consistent with the conservative philosophy of de-
creased federal control and more voice at the local level. 126
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization127 fol-
lowed Warth in 1976. The respondents in Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Organization were several indigent individuals and or-
ganizations representing indigents. They alleged that an Internal
122. Worth, 422 U.S at 507.
123. The Worth decision has been criticized as inconsistent with later decisions, espe-
cially Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See Nichol,
Backing Into the Future, supra note 11, at 368-70. Nichol states that "[a]n examination of
the causation cases arising after Warth and Eastern Kentucky reveals that the standard
appears to be sufficiently 'flexible' to allow the Court to hear those cases it may be anxious
to reach on the merits, and yet the standard remains a hurdle in 'less desirable' cases." Id.
at 368-69.
124. Nixon Statement, 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 55 (1972).
125. Nixon Sizes up the Future, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 18, 1971, at 64. See also
Color Zoning White, TIME, Sept. 7, 1970, at 51. ("The Nixon Administration is reluctant to
intervene vigorously in local housing disputes, even where federal subsidies are involved");
Nixon Housing Policy, 27 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 651, 658 (1971) (Nixon Administration would
oppose housing segregation based on race, but would not interfere with zoning laws exclud-
ing individuals for economic reasons).
126. See supra notes 21, 23, 25 and accompanying text, discussing the conservative New
Federalism policies. Id.
127. 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (Powell, J., wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Stewart,
White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger).
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Revenue Service (IRS) revenue ruling128 discriminated against in-
digents because it allowed hospitals to maintain their tax-exempt
status without providing services to indigent patients.129 The indi-
gent respondents alleged specific occasions on which they had been
denied hospital services because of their indigency. 130 The Court
admitted that "some [individuals] have been denied services" and
that these services were unavailable elsewhere.1 31
The Court cast the injury in terms of a denial of "access to hos-
pital services" 32 and held that this injury was insufficient to estab-
lish standing because no hospital had been named as a defend-
ant.133 The respondents argued that the government action-the
IRS revenue ruling-"encouraged" hospitals to deny services to in-
digents, but the Court held that such injury was not traceable di-
rectly to the government.
In other words, the "case or controversy" limitation of art. III
still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not injury that results from the independent action of some
third party not before the court.134
The Court also employed the high-threshold "redressability" fac-
tor developed in Warth,3 5 reasoning that even if respondents were
granted standing and obtained a favorable decision on the merits,
the hospital would not necessarily offer more services to indi-
128. Id. at 30-32. The challenged ruling in effect established a new IRS position on the
meaning of the term "charitable" for federal income tax purposes. To gain tax exempt sta-
tus as a charitable organization under the old ruling, a hospital had to satisfy four general
requirements. The requirement at issue in Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. had mandated
that a hospital "not, however, refuse to accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot
pay for such services." Id. at 30 (citation omitted). The new ruling provided that hospitals
could maintain their tax exempt status if they furnished full-time emergency room care and
referred patients unable to meet financial requirements to other hospitals providing indi-
gent care. See id. at 31-32.
129. Id. at 32-33.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 41.
132. Id. at 40.
133. Id. at 41.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 42-43. For a discussion of the redressability analysis in Warth, see supra notes
120-122 and accompanying text.
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gents. 3 s "[I]t is just as plausible that the hospitals to which re-
spondents may apply for service would elect to forgo favorable tax
treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of an increase
in the level of uncompensated services"'13 7
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization presents a mix-
ture of two core conservative themes: government decentraliza-
tion138 and restrictive social welfare policy.139 Justice Powell's
redressability analysis focused on the hospital's potential decision
to "forgo favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined finan-
cial drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated services."140
This statement reflects the conservative policy of reducing federal
involvement in matters regarded as essentially local in nature.
Conservatives favor a reduced federal role,' 4 ' especially if the in-
terests of the private sector are involved. Under this view, regula-
tion of the level of care a hospital provided to indigents simply
would not be the proper province of the federal government.
Justice Powell's opinion also mirrors conservative social welfare
policy. Conservatives continually express a desire to remove the
federal government from social welfare delivery and reduce the
overall levels of social welfare spending. 42 Requiring hospitals to
provide services for indigents in exchange for receiving tax exempt
status is not "social welfare" in the classic sense of the term. The
effect, however, is the same whether the government funds social
services directly or merely requires another entity to provide social
services in exchange for favorable government treatment.
136. Id. at 42-43.
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text, discussing the conservative viewpoint
over the past two decades on the proper role of the federal government in American society.
139. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text, discussing conservative social welfare
policy.
140. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 43.
141. In general, a recurrent conservative battle cry over the past two decades has been
one of "cutting big government." The crux of this policy is a deeply held belief that govern-
ment intervention is the problem, rather than the solution. Furthermore, if government
must perform a function, such responsibility should be handled at the state and local, rather
than the federal, level. See Nixon Urges Support For "New Federalism," "New Realism,"
supra note 19; President Reagan's Inaugural Address, supra note 23.
142. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text, discussing the conservative position
on government-sponsored social welfare policy.
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Given conservative disillusionment with the "mainstream" social
welfare programs, conservatives cannot be expected to support
provisions that furnish social services and employ government co-
ercion to accomplish the objective. By denying standing in Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the Court removed the
federal government from an area of primarily local concern and
also reduced the level of available social services.
The decisions in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion and Warth are similar in several respects. First, the Court de-
nied standing to a group of disadvantaged litigants. Second, both
denials rested on the premise that the injuries were both indirect
and not redressable. Third, each case has been criticized for its rig-
orous standing requirements. 143 Fourth, each case was substan-
tively consistent with the conservative agenda.
After Warth and Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, the high injury and redressability barriers were expected to
keep many litigants out of federal court. The litigants in Duke
Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group 44 and
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 45 however, man-
aged to overcome these barriers.
Duke Power Company involved a claim that the Price-Anderson
Act 146 was unconstitutional because it set a ceiling of $560 million
on the liability insurance required to operate a nuclear power
plant.147 Congress passed the Act to enable producers of nuclear
energy to afford liability insurance, thereby fostering the growth of
nuclear power. 48 The respondents alleged that they were injured
by radioactive discharges into the air and water as well as from the
143. See Sedler, supra note 10, at 873. "The standing bars that the Court imposed in
Warth and Eastern Kentucky are artificial ones; they deny access to the courts to interested
groups of persons whose interests are adversely affected by the actions they are challeng-
ing." Id. For a thorough discussion of the barriers erected in Warth and Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Org., see Nichol, supra note 10.
144. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
145. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality).
146. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982); Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 69.
147. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 67.
148. Id. at 64-65.
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fear of being inadequately compensated in the event of a nuclear
accident.14
The Court granted standing, holding that the petitioners had al-
leged injury in fact and had established that their injury was trace-
able to respondent's actions.15° Finally, the Court held that the
claims were capable of being redressed by a favorable decision on
the merits, stating that "[o]ur cases have required no more than a
showing [of] a 'substantial likelihood' that the relief requested will
redress the injury claimed.' 151
The seemingly lenient redressability threshold of Duke Power
Company generated a great deal of criticism concerning the incon-
sistent application of the redressability factor.12  The decision is,
however, quite consistent with the conservative goal of promoting
the uninhibited workings of the private sector. 53 Duke Power
Company is a classic example of a court stepping in to promote
this agenda.
149. Id. at 73. The respondents alleged the following specific injuries: the production of
small quantities of radiation in the air and water, a sharp increase in the temperature of
lake water resulting from its use to produce steam and cool the reactors, interference with
use of the Catawba River, threatened reduction in property values of land near the water,
present fear and apprehension of radioactivity, and the continual threat of a nuclear acci-
dent without compensation. Id.
150. Id. at 73-74.
151. Id. at 75 n.20. After granting standing, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Price-Anderson Act, rejecting the respondents' due process claim. Id. at 86-87.
152. Nichol, Backing Into the Future, supra note 11, at 370.
The Court gave no consideration to the much more difficult causation question
of whether the removal of the Price-Anderson Act limitation would cause Duke
Power Company to let two substantially developed nuclear plants stand idle.
Accordingly, standing was granted even though the redressability of the inju-
ries was solely dependent on the decision of a third party, Duke Power
Company.
The disparity between the cases can perhaps best be explained by the desire of
the Court to hear the merits in Duke Power, thereby making clear the consti-
tutional propriety of the Price-Anderson Act. Unfortunately for the low income
plaintiffs in both Worth and Eastern Kentucky, the Court had no similar in-
terest in the merits of their disputes.
Id. See also Nichol, supra note 8, at 72-73 n.27 (examining the fluctuating quality of the
redressability factor); Varat, supra note 11, at 278. "The artificial application of the [stand-
ing] doctrine [in Duke Power Co.] . . .leads one to believe that the Court in fact varied its
general view of justiciability on this occasion in order to place a constitutional stamp of
approval on an important federal policy." Id.
153. See supra notes 27, 29, 31 and accompanying text.
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Prior to the decision in Duke Power Company, the nuclear in-
dustry was weathering a storm of protest.' Supporters of nuclear
power felt that the Price-Anderson ceiling had to remain in place
to protect the nuclear industry from otherwise prohibitive insur-
ance costs that could have precluded future power plant construc-
tion.155 A denial of standing in Duke Power Company would have
produced the same result as the decision on the merits, but it
would have left the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act
shrouded in doubt and the nuclear industry in a vulnerable posi-
tion of instability. The industry would not have been assured that
in the future a proper plaintiff would not be granted standing to
challenge the Act's constitutionality. By granting standing to reach
the merits of the constitutionality challenge, the Court was able to
protect the nuclear industry by placing it on a surer economic
footing.
As in Duke Power Company, the Court in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke156 employed a comparably lenient
standing analysis to enable it to reach the merits of the case.
Bakke, a white male, had been denied admission to the medical
school at the University of California at Davis. He alleged that the
admissions policy at Davis discriminated against him by not al-
lowing him to compete for the spaces that were set aside exclu-
sively for members of certain disadvantaged groups.157
154. See Alpern, Anti-Atom Alliance, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1978, at 27-28 (reviewing the
then-growing alliance of environmentalists opposed to nuclear energy and groups opposing
the proliferation of nuclear weapons); King, Nuclear Power in Crisis, 41 VITAL SPEECHES 713
(1977-1978).
155. See Testing the Liability of Nuclear Operators, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 10, 1977, at 38-39.
In briefs to the Supreme Court, two members of the nuclear industry warned of the likely
fallout if Price-Anderson was struck down as unconstitutional. The Atomic Industrial Fo-
rum, Inc., an industry trade group, stated that "[r]emoving the limitation on liability...
could cause utilities to refrain from completing pending projects or undertaking new
projects and, conceivably, lead to the shutdown of existing reactors." Id. at 39. Babcock &
Wilcox, a corporation engaged in the construction of nuclear plants, stated that the demise
of Price-Anderson could have "a chilling effect on the further development of nuclear en-
ergy in the U.S." Id. Even without the issue of the liability ceiling, the nuclear industry was
beleaguered by the overall decreased demand for energy, by safety concerns, and by tighter
and costlier government regulation. See Nuclear Dilemma, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 25, 1978, at 54.
156. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
157. Id. at 272-77.
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The perfunctory standing analysis in Bakke is contained in a
single footnote. 15 8 In granting standing, the Court stated: "The
constitutional element of standing is plaintiff's demonstration of
any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision of his claim." '159 Regarding the standing analysis, the fact
patterns in Duke Power Company and Bakke appear indistin-
guishable from those in earlier cases in which the Court denied
standing.8 0 Once again, however, untangling the inconsistencies is
best accomplished with reference to the conservative agenda. The
Bakke case is an expression of conservative New Federalism. Con-
servatives believe that it is not the proper province of govern-
ment-including a state university system-to establish quotas.
Moreover, quotas are inconsistent with the ideals of a free enter-
prise system.
In 1972, Richard Nixon described fixed-quota systems as "un-
fair" and "anti-ability."16' Ronald Reagan has also voiced his op-
position to affirmative action programs as "reverse discrimina-
tion." '62 Generally, conservatives view quota systems as another
form of government intrusion that impedes the proper functioning
of the free market system. Reward based on merit is consistent
with a "free market" approach to problem solving. By finding the
Davis admissions policy unconstitutional, the Court succeeded in
furthering the conservative policy of disfavoring quotas. This pol-
158. Id. at 280-81 n.14.
159. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)) (emphasis added).
160. See Nichol, Backing Into the Future, supra note 11, at 371.
161. Nixon stated:
In employment and in politics, we are confronted with the rise of the fixed-
quota system - as artificial and unfair a yardstick as has ever been used to
deny opportunity to anyone. Again, as in many attacks on basic values, the
reasons are often well intentioned. Quotas are intended to be a short cut to
equal opportunity, but in reality are a dangerous detour away from the tradi-
tional value of measuring a person on the basis of ability.
Work v. Welfare: Where Nixon Stands, supra note 38, at 78.
162. See Head to Head on the Issues, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 6, 1980, at 59.
Ronald Reagan summed up his thoughts on the issue of affirmative action as follows:
I recognize the need to offer opportunity to those people to whom opportunity
has been denied for a long time. . . .I see affirmative action becoming a kind
of quota system. And I just believe that when that happens you have estab-
lished the precedent for new discrimination to take place. . . .We have turned
affirmative action into a kind of reverse discrimination.
Id. at 61.
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icy reflects the conservative belief in a decentralized federal gov-
ernment and the ability of the free market system to regulate soci-
ety's resources.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the
Separation of Church and State, Inc.,63 marked a return to a
heightened level of standing analysis. The respondents in Valley
Forge challenged the gratuitous transfer of federal government
property to a religious college that planned to use the property to
train ministers."" The respondents attempted to construct a Flast
argument by alleging that the transfer was an exercise of Con-
gress's taxing and spending power"6 5 and that it violated the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment.-6
The Court ruled that the respondents had not met the Flast test
because the source of their complaint was not a congressional ac-
tion but a decision by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to transfer federal property. 67 This narrow holding as to
what constitutes congressional action under the taxing and spend-
ing clause has generated considerable debate.6 8 The seemingly
hypertechnical argument made by Justice Rehnquist essentially
limited Flast to its facts and signaled the demise of taxpayer
standing.6 9 The decision in Valley Forge is comprehensible only
with reference to the Burger Court's promotion of the conservative
agenda.
Religious faith is one of the traditional values consistently cham-
pioned by conservatives. Although the school prayer and abortion
issues have been the most visible in the area of "traditional val-
ues, ' 1 °0 conservatives have advocated an overall rediscovery of reli-
gious values.' 7 ' Conservatives have expressed their belief that a
163. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
164. Id. at 469.
165. Id. at 482.
166. See id. They asserted that their right to a government that "shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion" had been violated. Id.
167. Id. at 479.
168. See Floyd, supra note 10, at 872-73 ("no 'principled basis' exists on which rights
asserted in Schlesinger and Richardson could be distinguished from Valley Forge"); Nichol,
Valley Forge, supra note 11.
169. See Nichol, Valley Forge, supra note 11.
170. See President Reagan and the Bible, supra note 47.
171. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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rigid dividing line between church and state is illegitimate and
that religious values should play a role in everyday American life.
They regard the fear of a church-state overlap as unwarranted.
The decision in Valley Forge supports this view by disposing of an
alleged violation of the establishment clause on justiciability
grounds. The Court's message is clear: the need to maintain a clear
separation between church and state is not important enough to
warrant relaxing the standing analysis to decide the merits.
CONCLUSION
The Burger Court's standing decisions are incapable of reconcili-
ation using a coherent and consistent analytical standard. These
decisions are better explained by probing the deeper issues at
stake in each case. Each decision is consistent with underlying con-
servative goals. The Court's flexible standing analysis alternately
erected high barriers to restrict access to the courts and lowered
the threshold to allow ready access. The analytical framework es-
tablished by the Burger Court has abused the standing doctrine
and made it little more than a convenient vehicle to promote the
conservative agenda.
David A. Domansky
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